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NOTES

RACE SEGREGATION ORDINANCE INvALID.- The opinion in Buchanan
v. Warley I reflects the confusion and difficulty of that troublesome prob-

I October Term, 1917, No. 33.
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lem, the place of the negro race in the United States, with which the
case and the segregation ordinance of Louisville discussed therein are
essentially concerned. The decision by a unanimous court reverses the
holding of the Kentucky Court of Appeals,2 and declares that the ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment. This result is reached by
one of those anomalous and objectionable devices which characterize
our methods of solving fundamental constitutional questions. The case
arose upon a bill for specific performance of a contract, whereby the
plaintiff, a white man, agreed to sell, and defendant, a colored man,
agreed to buy certain real estate situated in a block in which the majority of houses were occupied by white people. The defense was based
upon a provision of the contract to the effect that the purchaser should
not be required to perform unless he had "the right under the laws of
the State of Kentucky and the City of Louisville to occupy said property
as a residence," and upon the ordinance above referred to.
That ordinance, approved May 11, 1914, in effect prohibits any
colored person to move into and occupy, as a residence, or to establish
and maintain as a place of public assembly, any house upon any block
upon which a greater number of houses are occupied for such purposes
by white people than by colored people. Another section contains the
converse of this prohibition; and by still another the location of residences
and of places of assembly made, and the continued occupancy of such
premises begun by white or colored persons, prior to the approval of the
ordinance, are expressly excepted from the scope and effect thereof.
It would be difficult to frame an ordinance which should accomplish any
measure of segregation, with more restricted scope or less effect upon
property rights than this one. If the present decision shall stand, therefore, it would seem that race segregation by legal compulsion, at least
in cities, must be abandoned as a vain effort.
Doubtless this is a desirable result to reach. Quite possibly, if indeed
not probably, race segregation of the block or " checker-board" 3 type
would aggravate the very evil which its sponsors aim to cure. Be that
as it may, it is difficult to feel convinced that the result has been reached
by sound canons of judicial review. It is apparent that the primary,
the real, interests involved in the ordinance are certain civil rights of the
negro race guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and yet that the
invalidity of the ordinance was determined professedly solely with reference to the property right of a white man. Here is an ordinance embodying a policy of immense potential importance to the negro race, which
in terms treats both races alike, but which it requires no argument to
show, in fact discriminates heavily against the negro; 4 and yet we are
treated to the strange and disquieting spectacle of having the argument
against the validity of the ordinance presented only by a white man,
while a negro stands forth as its only proponent. True, as the ordinance
was declared unconstitutional, the negro race cannot complain of the
result. True, also, that the Supreme Court, under settled rules of practice, had no choice but to pass upon the one issue legally presented to it;
2 r65 Ky. 559, 177 S. W. 472.
S SeeTimNEwREPuB
Hc, December8, 1917, anarticleonthe Southiricansituation.
4 See 27 HARv. L. REV. 270.
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namely, as to whether the ordinance, if enforced, would deprive the
white plaintiff of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
This criticism is directed not at the result reached in this particular
instance, nor at the Supreme Court for following a long-established rule
of practice in constitutional cases, but rather at that rule or system
which permits of the entertaining and determination of legal and political questions of the most profound importance to the entire country,
upon such a casual, oblique and unscientific presentation of the real interests involved. 5
Conceding, however, that under established practice the court had
no option but to pass upon the case as presented, can the reasoning of
the court by which its decision is reached be reconciled, with the long
settled principle that courts shall declare legislation invalid, only when
its unconstitutionality is clear beyond any reasonable doubt? Though
this principle has from the beginning of our constitutional history been
constantly asserted,6 courts have seemingly found it difficult to determine what is meant by it in application to particular cases, and it has
not by any means always been adhered to.7 The rule stated repeatedly
and in various forms by the Supreme Court has perhaps never been more
accurately expressed than by J. B. Thayer: 8 "It [the court] can only
disregard the Act when those who have the right to make laws have not
merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one, - so clear that
it is not open to rational question. That is the test which they apply not merely their own judgment as to constitutionality, but their conclusion as to what judgment is permissible to another department which
the constitution has charged with the duty of making it."
Had the instant case involved an act of Congress or even a statute of
a state legislature, it scarcely could be contended that the court had
observed this rule of caution, and it is at least doubtful if it gave sufficient
weight to the presumption of validity attaching to the act of even such a
subordinate legislative body as a city council. The Supreme Court has
not formulated a scale by which to weigh the presumptions of validity
attaching to the acts of Congress, of state legislatures and of subordinate
legislative bodies respectively, but it may be conceded courts do, as a
matter of practice and not without reason, attach somewhat less weight
to the presumption of validity as to the acts of inferior officers and bodies
than to those of cordinate rank. Nevertheless, if the subordinate legislature has authority to pass any act of this character, a strong presumption of its reasonableness arises, 9 and the opinion in the present case is
5 This defect in our system by which important questions of constitutional law
have frequently been decided upon the basis of subsidiary questions only is partially
responsible for the recent agitation for that misconceived "reform" the "recall of
Judicial decisions."
6 See TnAsR, LEGAL ESSAYS, i3-19, for a citation of the earliest cases enunciating this rule.
7 See address by Roscoe Pound, TRANsAcTioNs, MARYL
BAR Assoc., 1909,
3OI, citing FREuND, 17 GREEN BAG, 416; DODDS, 24 POL. ScI. QUARTERLY, 193.
8 Id. 21. See also for a most helpful analysis of the rule, Coory, CoNsTrruTIoNAL LIMITATIONS,

7 ed., 227-46.

" In re Anderson, i8 Cal. App. 593,

123 Pac. 972; In re Berry, 147 Cal. 523;
Miller v. Birmingham, 151 Ala. 469; C. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Averill, 224 Ill. 5x6; State v.
Trenton, 53 N. J. L. 132. See DLmLoN, MuNic. CORP. (5 ed.) § 649.
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not convincing in its effort'to show that the doubtful element therein is
anything other than its reasonableness. The court says: "its solution cannot be promoted by depriving citizens of their constitutional
rights and privileges"; and again, "this aim cannot be accomplished
by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or protected by the
Federal Constitution."
But the only constitutional right which the court holds is violated is
that guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, that property shall
not be taken without due process of law, and the property taken in this
case, according to the court, is that of the white plaintiff. The court
does not hold that any right of the negro has been violated. The injury done to the white man consists of the restriction imposed by the
ordinance upon the sale of property. But inasmuch as it has been
held repeatedly that property may be taken or its use or disposition restricted for reasonable police purposes, it is apparent that in deciding a
case upon the mere assertion that property has been taken without due
process the court has come dangerously near to begging the whole
question.
That question, then, is simply whether the taking of property by the
ordinance was reasonable, and it is difficult to see on what basis the court,
could have declared it so dearly lacking in reasonableness as to be unconstitutional. In the first place, the ordinance had already been dedared reasonable and valid by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, 0 and
very similar ordinances have been sustained in other states." In all of
the cases cited in notes io and ii the segregation ordinances passed
upon have been declared reasonable exercises of the police power, because
they would tend to prevent race friction, disorder and violence. The
ordinance in question recites that it is passed for this purpose. While
opinions may well differ as to the efficacy and ultimate consequences
of such measures, can it be said that there is no reasonable and
appropriaterelation between the end sought and the means adopted? The
Supreme Court of the United States must find it difficult to say that
there is no such relation, for it had already sustained state legislation requiring railway companies to provide in their coaches equal, but separate, accommodations for the two races,5 and a state statute requiring
the separation of the races in schools.5 Many state courts have upheld
similar legislation.' 4 State courts have also sustained legislation forbidding the intermarriage between races. There are three cases holding
segregation ordinances invalid, but two of them are clearly distinguishable
from the present case. In State v. Curry, 121 Md. 534, such an ordinance
was held invalid, but upon the express ground that it did not except
from its operation rights of occupancy acquired before the ordinance
was enacted. 8 In State v. Darnell,i66 N. C. 300, a similar ordinance,
10 165 Ky. 559, 177 S. W. 472.

1 Ashland v. Coleman, x9

VA. LAW REG. 427;

Harden v. Atlanta (Ga.), 93 S.E.

4o; Hopkins v. Richmond, 117 Va. 692, 86 S. E. 139.
12 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537.
11Berea College Case, 211 U. S. 45.
14 Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 198; Lehew v. Brummell,

,546, s5 S. W. 765.

1o3

Mo.

u State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389. Cf. Pace v. Alabama, xo6 U. S. 583.
16 Counsel for-both parties admitted that there had been "more or less friction re-
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but making no exception as to occupancy already established was declared invalid as exceeding the charter powers of the city council.
In Cary v. Atlanta, i43 Ga. 192, the ordinance was declared invalid on
the ground that it worked such a deprivation of property as to violate
both the Federal and State constitutions.
In this view of the case it is difficult to resist the belief that perhaps
the court's decision was in reality consciously or sub-consciously based
upon the conviction that the restriction imposed by the ordinance upon
the plaintiff's right to dispose of his property was not clearly unreasonable in relation to the possible benefit to the public welfare, but rather
upon the feeling that the ordinance, while equal and reciprocal in phraseology, as regards the two races, does in reality, the facts of life being
what they are, discriminate heavily against the negro race, and that the
restrictions thus put upon its rights to acquire, use and sell property
with all the consequences entailed are altogether greater than any possible good to be derived by the general public therefrom. Possibly the
court foresees that the line has now been reached where the dangers
suggested by Justice Harlan in his strong dissenting opinion in the
Civil Rights Cases, Io9 U. S. 3, has been reached. 7 The court may have
felt that even conceding that the ordinance, if sustained, might tend to
prevent conflicts between individuals or small groups from the two races,
its ultimate effect in building up wholly black and wholly white communities in the same city would almost certainly produce far greater
and more menacing conflicts than those which the present ordinance is
supposed to prevent.
It may well be that by a process of unexpressed reasoning, the
court has reached a sound result in this case; but dearly the real
question involved ought to be settled only after careful consideration
of the facts, as to the effect of propinquity and intermingling of the
races. Perhaps there is sufficient danger in such contacts as to justify
this legislation, perhaps not. It is regrettable that the whole problem
could not have been brought before the court, by the aid of briefs such
as those filed by Mr. Brandeis and Professor Frankfurter in the Oregon
cases.' 8

sulting from the occupancy by colored people of houses in blocks theretofore occupied
wholly by white people." "With this acknowledgment," says the court, "how can it
be contended that the City Council, charged with looking to the welfare of the city, is
seeking to make an unreasonable use of the police power, when it enacts a law which,
in their opinion, will tend to prevent the conflict?" See page 547 of the opinion.
17 Cf. McCabe v. Atchison, etc. Ry. Co. 235 U. S. 151.
18 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412; Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U. S. 629. As to the
importance of presenting scientific and dependable data bearing upon the facts and
conditions affected by legislation regulating social and industrial relationships, see the
following articles: "Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law," by Felix
Frankfurter, 29 HARv. L. REv. 353; "Limitation of Hours of Labor and the Federal Supreme Court," by Ernst Freund, 17 GRaEN BAG, 411; "Due Process,
the Inarticulate Major Premise and the Adamson Law," by Albert M. Kales, 26
YALE LAW J. 519; "Liberty of Contract," by Roscoe Pound, 18 YA=E LAW J. 454.
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